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Abstract
The present paper applies well-investigated modal logics to provide
formal foundations to speciﬁc fragments of argumentation theory. This
logic-driven analysis of argumentation allows: ﬁrst, to systematize several
results of argumentation theory reformulating them within suitable formal
languages; second, to import several techniques (calculi, model-checking
games, bisimulation games); third, to import results (completeness of ax-
iomatizations, complexity of model-checking, adequacy of games) from
modal logic to argumentation theory.
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1 Introduction
Thepaperpresentsastudyintheformalfoundationsofabstractargumentation
theory as introduced in [11] by applying methods and techniques borrowed
from modal logic [1]. The paper shows how standard results in argumentation
theory obtain elegant reformulations within well-investigated modal logics.
This allows to import a number of techniques (e.g., calculi, logical games) as
well as results (e.g. completeness, complexity, adequacy) from modal logic to
argumentation theory, and to do that essentially for free. Also, as it is often the
case in the cross-fertilization of dierent formalisms, such perspective opens
up interesting lines of research which were thus far hidden to the attention of
argumentation theorists.
Let us start o with the basic notion of argumentation theory. An abstract
argumentation framework is a relational structure A = (A;) where A is a
non-empty set, and  A2 is a relation on A [11]. This paper investigates the
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simplebutyetunexploredideawhichconsistsinviewingDung’sabstractargu-
mentationframeworksasKripkeframes(W;R)[1]. Modallanguagesarelogical
languageswhichareparticularlysuitablefortalkingaboutrelationalstructures
[2] so, from the point of view of this paper, Dung’s argumentation frameworks
are nothing but Kripke relational frames where the set of arguments A is the
set of modal states W, and the attack relation  is the accessibility relation R.
The entire content of the paper hinges on this simple observation.
The paper presupposes some knowledge of modal logic as well as of ar-
gumentation theory. However, the latter is brieﬂy recapitulated in Appendix
A. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a
well-known modal logic—logic K with converse relation—as a logic for talk-
ing about argumentation frameworks. Section 3 uses this logic to formalize a
ﬁrst set of argumentation-theoretic notions such as acceptability, complete and
stable extensions. The exposition of such notion will as much as possible stick
to [11], in order to emphasize the easiness of modal languages in capturing
the natural intuitions backing argumentation theory. As we will see, how-
ever, the formalization of such notions can be done only in the meta-language.
Section 4 moves on by introducing the further expressivity needed to express
argumentation theory in the object language. This enables the possibility of us-
ing calculi to derive argumentation-theoretic results such as the Fundamental
Lemma [11], and import complexity results concerning, for instance, checking
whether an argument belongs to the stable extension of a framework under a
given labeling. Along the same line, Section 5 tackles the formalization of the
notion of grounded extension within -calculus. In Section 6 semantic games
are studied for the logic introduced in Section 4 which provide a systemati-
zation of dialogue games as model-checking games. Finally, Section 7 tackles
the question—not yet addressed in the literature on argumentation theory—of
when two arguments, or two argumentation frameworks, are “the same”. In
order to shed light on this question the model-theoretic notion of bisimulation
is deployed and bisimulation games are introduced as a procedural method to
checkthe“behavioralequivalence”oftwoargumentationframeworks. Related
work as well as gaps in the present state of this study are discussed in Section 8.
Conclusions follow in Section 9 where future research lines are also sketched.
2 A modal toolkit for argumentation
This section introduces the modal view of argumentation theory investigated
in the paper.
2.1 Argumentation models
Doing argumentation theory ` a la Dung means, essentially, to study speciﬁc
propertiesofsetsofarguments(e.g.,conﬂict-freeness,acceptability,etc.) within
a given argumentation framework A. Once an argumentation framework
is viewed as a Kripke frame we can directly import the simple machinery
deployed by modal logic to talk about sets, that is, valuation functions. If an
argumentation framework can be viewed as a Kripke frame, as explained in
the introduction , then an argumentation framework plus a function assigning
names from a set P to sets of arguments can be viewed as a Kripke model [1].
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Deﬁnition 1 (Argumentation models). Let P be a set of propositional atoms. An
argumentation model M = (A;I) is a structure such that:
 A = (A;) is an argumentation framework;
 I : P  ! 2A is an assignment from P to subsets of A.
The set of all argumentation models is called A. A pointed argumentation model is a
pair (M;a) where M is an argumentation model and a an argument.
Argumentationmodelsarenothingbutargumentationframestogetherwith
a way of “naming” sets of arguments or, to put it otherwise, of “labeling”
arguments. In other words, they make explicit the language which is used for
talking about sets of arguments. The fact that an argument a belongs to I(p) in
a given model M, which in logical notation reads:
(A;I);a j= p (1)
can be interpreted as stating that “argument a has property p” , or that “p is
true of a”.
By substituting atom p in Formula 1 with a Boolean compound ' (i.e.,
' := p ^ q) we can say that “a belongs to both the sets called p and q”, and the
same can be done for all other Boolean connectives. The following example
applies this insight to argumentation labeling functions [5].
Example 1. (Argument labelings as argumentation models) In argumentation theory,
a labeling function [5] is a function l : f1;0;?g  ! A from the set of three labels f 1, 0,
? g—intuitively in, out, undecided—to the set of arguments A.
From a logical point of view, such a function is equivalent to a valuation function
I : P  ! 2A with the further constraint that each argument can get at most one label
which, in propositional logic, amounts to the following formula:
Label := (1 ^ :0 ^ :?) _ (:1 ^ 0 ^ :?) _ (:1 ^ :0 ^ ?):
As a consequence, a framework A with a labeling function is nothing but an argumen-
tation model M = (A;I) s.t. M j= Label. We will come back later to the sort of
labeling used in argumentation theory to characterize extensions, and show that they
can be characterized by modal formulae.
Formula Label in the example is just a propositional formula but what is
typically interesting in argumentation theory are statements of the sort: “argu-
ment a is attacked by an argument in a set '”; “argument a is defended by the
set '”, or, “' attacks an attacker of argument a”. These are modal statements,
andinordertoexpressthem,itsucestointroduceadedicatedmodaloperator
h i whose intuitive reading is “there exists an attacking argument such that”.
The next section introduces the kind of formal language needed for expressing
them.
2.2 A basic modal logic for argumentation
We here introduce a ﬁrst stadard modal logic for talking about the sort of
structures introduced in Deﬁnition 1.
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2.2.1 Language.
Let us now formally introduce the modal language we are going to work with,
which we call LK 1
. It consists of a countable set P of propositional atoms, the
set of Boolean connectives f?;:;^g, and the set of modal operators fhi;h ig.
The set of well-formed formulae ' is deﬁned by the following BNF:
LK 1
: ' ::= p j ? j :' j ' ^ ' j hi' j h i'
where p ranges over P. The other standard boolean connectives f>;_;!g, and
the modal duals f[];[ ]g are deﬁned as usual.
We can now express that “a attacks an argument belonging to a set called
'” (Formula 2), that “a is attacked by an argument in a set called '” (Formula
3), or that “a reinstates an argument in '” (Formula 3) in the sense that it attacks
an attacker of a ' argument, or that “a is defended by the set '” (Formula 3):
(A;I);a j= hi' (2)
(A;I);a j= h i' (3)
(A;I);a j= hihi' (4)
The next section makes these intuitive readings exact by deﬁning the formal
semantics of LK 1
in terms of argumentation models.
2.2.2 Semantics.
The formal semantics of LK 1
is deﬁned as usual via the notion of satisfaction
of a formula in a model.
Deﬁnition 2 (Satisfaction for LK 1
in argumentation models). Let ' 2 LK 1
. The
satisfaction of ' by a pointed argumentation model (M;a) is inductively deﬁned as
follows:
M;a 6j= ?
M;a j= p i a 2 I(p); for p 2 P
M;a j= :' i M;a 6j= '
M;a j= '1 ^ '2 i M;a j= '1 and M;a j= '2
M;a j= hi' i 9b 2 A : (a;b) 2  and M;b j= '
M;a j= h i' i 9b 2 A : (a;b) 2  1 and M;b j= '
As usual, the truth-set of ' in model M is denoted jj'jjM.1 We say that: ' is valid in
an argumentation model M i it is satisﬁed in all pointed models of M, i.e., M j= ';
' is valid in a class M of argumentation models i it is valid in all its models, i.e.,
M j= '. All deﬁnitions are naturally generalizable to sets of formulae .
Let us comment upon the two modal clauses. A formula hi' is satisﬁed
by argument a in model M if and only if there exists an argument b such that a
attacks b and b belongs to the set jj'jjM. Conversely, a formula h i' is satisﬁed
by argument a in model M if and only if there exists an argument b such that a
1Subscript M will often be dropped when no confusion arises.
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is attacked by b and b belongs to the set jj'jjM. In other words h i is interpreted
on the inverse  1 of the attack relation .
Deﬁnition2providesastructuredwaytodeﬁnesetsofargumentsbymeans
of expressions of LK 1
. If an argument belongs to a set speciﬁed by ' in M, that
is a 2 jj'jjM, then we write M;a j= ' and we say that a satisﬁes ' or that a is a
'-argument.
The set of formulae ' of LK 1
such that A j= ', deﬁnes logic K 1. Such
logic contains all the truths concerning argumentation frameworks which can
be expressed in LK 1
. The next section introduces a Hilbert calculus for this
logic.
2.2.3 Axiomatics.
Logic K 1 is axiomatized by the following set of schemata and rules:
(Prop) propositional schemata
(K) [i]('1 ! '2) ! ([i]'1 ! [i]'2)
(Conv) ' ! [i]:[j]:'
(Dual) hii $ :[i]:'
(MP) if ` '1 ! '2 and ` '1 then '2
(N) if ` ' then ` [i]'
with i , j 2 f; g. We have the following result.
2.2.4 Meta-theoretical results.
We have the following results:
 Logic K 1 is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class A of
all argumentation models under the semantics given in Deﬁnition 2 (see
Appendix B for a the proof).
 The satisﬁability problem of K 1 is P-reducible to the one of K in the
presenceofabackgroundtheory[14],whichisknowntobeEXP-complete
[22].
In the next section the logic just introduced is used to start o with a ﬁrst
formalization of some basic argumentation-theoretic notions.
3 Doing argumentation in K 1: basic notions
How much of abstract argumentation can be done within K 1? The present sec-
tion answers this question. Surprisingly, almost all the key notions introduced
by Dung in [11] can be expressed and study resorting to this a simple logic,
although only at the level of the meta-language.
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3.1 Acceptability, conﬂict-freeness and admissibility
Given an argumentation model M, an argument is said to be acceptable with
respect to a set jj'jj in M if and only if for all arguments b attacking a there exists
one '-argument c s.t. c attacks b. That is:
M;a j= [ ]h i' (5)
In other words, formula [ ]h i' states that for any attack on a there exists a
reinstatement from a jj'jj-argument.
Similarly, we can express that a set of arguments jj'jj is acceptable with
respect to a set of arguments jj jj in model M. This holds if and only if all
arguments a in jj'jj are acceptable with respect to jj jj. That is to say, jj'jj 
jj[ ]h i jj, which in modal logic corresponds to the statement of the following
global property:
M j= ' ! [ ]h i  (6)
Toputitotherwise, formula' ! [ ]h i statesthatthesetofargumentsjj'jjis
abletodefendallitsmembersfromtheattackofotherarguments(whicharealso
possibly in jj'jj). The notion of self-acceptability is therefore straightforwardly
deﬁned:
M j= ' ! [ ]h i' (7)
Global properties of models such as Formulae 6 and 7 are typical example of
the type of notions playing a central role in argumentation theory.
Other global properties of argumentation models which play a key role in
Dung’s theory are conﬂict-freeness and admissibility. A set of arguments jj'jj is
said to be conﬂict free in M i no argument in jj'jj attacks any argument in jj'jj:
M j= ' ! :hi' (8)
That is to say, jj'jj is conﬂict-free if and only if either an argument does not
satisfy ' or, if it is a '-argument, then it does not attack any '-argument. It is
a matter of direct application of the semantics to prove the following fact.
Fact 1 (Equivalence of  and   for conﬂict-freeness). Let M be an argumentation
model. It holds that:
M j= ' ! :hi' () M j= ' ! :h i'
Proof. [Left to right] We proceed per absurdum.Take M j= ' ! :hi' and
suppose M 6j= ' ! :h i'. It follows that there exist arguments a and b such
that b   a and M;a j= '. However, from the assumption we have that if
M;a j= ', then for all arguments b such that a  b, M;b j= :'. We thus obtain
a contradiction. [Right to left] An analogous argument per absurdum can be
used. 
So,aswemightexpect,conﬂict-freenesscanbeequivalentlydescribedeither
by thinking in terms of arguments attacking other arguments, or by thinking
in terms of arguments being attacked by other arguments.
Acceptability and conﬂict-freeness together determine the admissibility of a
set of arguments. A set jj'jj is admissible in M if and only if it is acceptable in
M with respect to itself, that is, if and only if the following validity holds:
M j= (' ! :hi') ^ (' ! [ ]h i') (9)
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Acc('; ;M) () M j= ' ! [ ]h i 
CFree(';M) () M j= ' ! :hi'
Adm(';M) () M j= ' ! ([]:' ^ [ ]h i')
Table 1: Acceptability, conﬂict-freeness and admissibility in LK 1
which,bypropositionallogic,isequivalenttothefollowingslickerformulation:
M j= ' ! ([]:' ^ [ ]h i') (10)
Formulae9and10statethatthesetof'-argumentsissuchthatallitsarguments
attack arguments that do not belong to jj'jj, and all arguments attacking its
arguments are reinstated by other '-arguments. If this holds for a ' in , in an
argumentation model M, then jj'jj is admissible in M.
Table 1 recapitulates the formalization in K 1 of self-acceptability, conﬂict-
freenes and admissibility. All such notions can be captured as validities of LK 1
formulae in the argumentation model at issue.
3.2 Complete and stable extensions
In [11], the “solution” of an argumentation framework is a set of arguments
which can be considered as a “rational position” to be held according to some
kind of precisely deﬁned notion of rationality. Two of such solution concepts
are the so-called complete and stable extensions.
Given an argumentation model M, a complete extension of M is a set jj'jj
which is admissible in M and is such that any argument which is acceptable
for jj'jj in M belongs to jj'jj. In LK 1
this becomes:
M j= ' ! ([]:' ^ [ ]h i') ^ ([ ]h i' ! ') (11)
which, by propositional logic, is equivalent to:
M j= (' ! []:') ^ (' $ [ ]h i') (12)
So, a set of '-arguments is a complete extension of an argumentation model M
isuchsetisconﬂict-freeinM(ﬁrstconjunctofFormula12)anditisequivalent
to the set of arguments it defends (second conjunct of Formula 12).
We can similarly capture the notion of stable extension for a given argu-
mentation model M. According to Dung, jj'jj is a stable extension if and only
if jj'jj is the set of arguments which is not attacked by jj'jj, that is:
M j= ' $ :h i' (13)
Table 2 recapitulates the semantic deﬁnitions of completeness and stability in
K 1. The following fact can be proven by model-theoretic considerations.
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Fact2(Stabilityimpliesadmissibility). LetM = (A;I)beanargumentationmodel.
It holds that:
Stable(';M) =) Adm(';M):
Proof. [Stable(';M) =) CFree(';M)] We proceed per absurdum. Consider
M j= ' $ :h i' and suppose there exists a 2 A such that M;a j= ' ^ hi'.
Then there exists b 2 A such that a  b and M;b j= ', which is impossible since
M;b j= :h i' by assumption. [Stable(';M) =) Acc(';';M)] We proceed
again per absurdum. Consider the contrapositive of Formula 13, i.e., M j=
:' $ h i', and suppose there exists a 2 A such that M;a j= ' ^ :[ ]h i'.
It follows that there exists ab 2 A such that a   b and M;b j= :' ^ [ ]:'.
From this, by our assumption, it follows that M;b j= h i' ^ [ ]:', which is
impossible. 
Fact2showshowmodel-theoreticpropertiesofK 1 reﬂectbasictheoremsof
abstract argumentation. It is worth noticing that the proof of this fact cannot be
carried out as a derivation within K 1 since it lacks the necessary expressivity
to represent validity within a model as a formula in the object language (e.g.,
the universal modality [1]). A more expressive logic where this can be done is
exposed in Appendix. Here we have opted for a simpler formalism which can
better illustrate the methodology behind our work.
3.3 Characteristic functions and K 1
Each argumentation framework A = (A;) determines a characteristic function
cA : 2A  ! 2A such that for any set of arguments X, cA(X) yields the set of
arguments in A which are acceptable with respect to X, i.e., fa 2 A j 8b 2 A :
[b  a ) 9c 2 X : c  b]g.2 Does logic K 1 have a syntactic counterpart of the
characteristic function? The answer turns out to be yes.
Let L[ ]h i be the language deﬁned by the following BNF:
L[ ]h i : ' ::= p j ? j :' j ' ^ ' j [ ]h i'
where p belongs to the set of atoms P. Notice that L[ ]h i is the fragment
of LK 1
containing only the compounded modal operator [ ]h i. Let A+ =
(2A;\; ;;;cA) be the power set algebra on 2A extended with operator cA, and
consider the term algebra terL[ ]h i = (L[ ]h i;^;:;?;[ ]h i). Finally, let I :
L[ ]h i  ! 2A be the inductive extension of a valuation function I : P  ! 2A
2It might be worth mentioning the following. Let cA(A) be the set of images obtained by
applying cA to 2A. It is easy to show that
Sn
i=1 cA(Xi) = cA(
Sn
i=1 Xi) and its dual hold for Xi  A.
So, cA(A) forms a complete lattice of sets [9]. Such a lattice is also bounded by cA(;) and A.
Complete(';M) () M j= (' ! []:') ^ (' $ [ ]h i')
Stable(';M) () M j= ' $ :h i'
Table 2: Complete and stable extensions in LK 1
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according to the semantics given in Deﬁnition 3. We can prove the following
result.
Theorem 1 (cA vs. [ ]h i). Let M = (A;I) be an argumentation model. Function
I is a homomorphism from terL[ ]h i to A+.
Proof. ThecaseofBooleanconnectivesistrivial. Itremainstobeproventhatfor
any ': jj[ ]h i'jjM = cA(jj'jjM): It suces to spell out the semantics of [ ]h i
recalling that   =  1:
jj[ ]h i'jjM = fa 2 A j 8b : a   b;9c : b   c and c 2 jj'jjMg
= fa 2 A j 8b : b  a;9c : c  b and c 2 jj'jjMg
= cA(jj'jjM):
This completes the proof. 
Theorem1showsthatthecomplexmodaloperator[ ]h i,undertheseman-
tics provided in Deﬁnition 2, behaves exactly like the characteristic function of
the argumentation frameworks on which the argumentation models are built.
To put it yet otherwise, formulae of the form [ ]h i' denote the value of the
characteristic function applied to the set of '-arguments.
From Theorem 1 it becomes thus clear that: a self-acceptable set of argu-
ments jj'jj is a set for which [ ]h i increases, i.e., jj'jj  jj[ ]h i'jj (Formula
5); an admissible set of arguments jj'jj is a conﬂict-free set for which [ ]h i is
increasing (Formula 9); a complete extension jj'jj is a ﬁxpoint of [ ]h i, i.e.,
jj'jj = jj[ ]h i'jj (Formula 11). All such statements are counterparts of state-
ments to be found in [11]. We can now study the properties of [ ]h i' by
resorting to the semantics of K 1.
Fact 3 (Model-theoretic properties of [ ]h i). Let M = (A;I) be an argumenta-
tion model and Ms = (As;I) a serial argumentation model, that is, such that  1 in
As is serial. It holds that, for any M, M:
Monotonicity: M j= '1 ! '2 =) M j= [ ]h i'1 ! [ ]h i'2
Normality: Ms j= ' ! ? =) Ms j= [ ]h i' ! ?
Proof. [Monotonicity] Let us proceed per absurdum, assuming that M j= '1 !
'2 and M 6j= [ ]h i'1 ! [ ]h i'2. This latter means that there exists a 2 A
such that M;a j= [ ]h i'1 ^ h i[ ]:'2 which in turn implies the existence
of b 2 A such that M;b j= h i'1 ^ [ ]:'2. Given the assumption this is
impossible. [Normality] It can be proven directly. Assume Ms j= ' ! ? and
Ms j= [ ]h i'. It follows that Ms j= [ ]h i? which is impossible since  1 is
serial in Ms. Hence Ms j= [ ]h i' ! ?. 
Monotonicity guarantees that the set of arguments reinstating arguments in
a given set jj'jj grows if jj'jj grows. Normality states that in a serial argumenta-
tion model the set of arguments which is acceptable with respect to the empty
set, i.e., jj?jj, is empty.3
3It might be instructive to notice that seriality implies non well-foundedness since if  1 is
serial, every argument has a  1-successor.
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4 Argumentation in K8: universal modality
The previous section has introduced a modal logic for talking about the rela-
tions of “attacking” and “being attacked by”. However, as shown in Table 1
and 2, and on the ground of Fact 1, the only relation occurring in the formal-
ization of the argumentation theoretic notions considered is the relation  , i.e.,
“being attacked by”. In this section, we restrict K 1 to its “being attacked by”
fragment—thus allowing only the h i and [ ] modal operators—and extend it
with the universal modality [1]. The resulting system is nothing but K8, that is,
the minimal normal modal logic K extended with the universal modality.
4.1 Logic K8
Logic K8 is a well-investigated system. In this section we recapitulate its se-
mantics, axiomatics and some of its meta-logical properties.
4.1.1 Language.
As anticipated above, the language of K8 is a standard modal language built
on the set of atoms P by the following BNF:
LK8
: ' ::= p j ? j :' j ' ^ ' j h i' j h8i'
where p ranges over P. The other standard boolean connectives f>;_;!g, and
the modal duals f[ ];[8]g are deﬁned as usual.
LogicK8 isthereforeendowedwithmodaloperatorsofthetype“thereexists
an argument attacking the current one such that”—h i—and “there exists an
argument such that”—h8i—together with their duals.
4.1.2 Semantics.
The semantics of K8 extends the one of K 1 (Deﬁnition 2) with the clause for
the universal modality.
Deﬁnition 3 (Satisfaction for LK8
in argumentation models). Let ' 2 LK8
. The
satisfaction of ' by a pointed argumentation model (M;a) is inductively deﬁned as
follows (Boolean clauses are omitted):
M;a j= h i' i 9b 2 A : (a;b) 2  1 and M;b j= '
M;a j= h8i' i 9b 2 A : M;b j= '
We say that: ' is valid in an argumentation model M i it is satisﬁed in all pointed
models of M, i.e., M j= '; ' is valid in a class M of argumentation models i it is
valid in all its models, i.e., M j= '. All deﬁnitions are naturally generalizable to sets of
formulae .
In words, what K8 adds to K 1 is existential and universal quantiﬁcation via
the universal modalities h8i and [8].
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4.1.3 Axiomatics.
The logic K8 is axiomatized as follows:
(Prop) propositional tautologies
(K) [i]('1 ! '2) ! ([i]'1 ! [i]'2)
(T) [8]' ! '
(4) [8]' ! [8][8]'
(5) :[8]' ! [8]:[8]'
(Incl) [8]' ! [i]'
(Dual) hii' $ :[i]:'
with i 2 f ;8g.
4.1.4 Meta-theoretical results.
We list the following known results, which are relevant for our purposes.
 Logic K8 is sound and strongly complete for the class A of argumentation
frames [1, Ch. 7].
 The complexity of deciding whether a formula of LK8
is satisﬁable is
EXP-complete [17].
 The complexity of checking whether a formula of LK8
is satisﬁed by a
pointed model M is P-complete [16].
4.2 Doing argumentation in K8
We have now a calculus which ﬁts very well with argumentation models. The
present section shows how such calculus, and its semantics, can be concretely
deployedtoexpressbasicnotionofargumentationtheoryinaformallanguage,
and consequently obtain formal proofs of theorems of argumentation theory.
LogicK8 isexpressiveenoughtocapturethefollowingnotionsintheobject-
language.
Acc('; ) := [8](' ! [ ]h i ) (14)
CFree(') := [8](' ! :h i') (15)
Adm(') := [8](' ! ([ ]:' ^ [ ]h i')) (16)
Complete(') := [8]((' ! [ ]:') ^ (' $ [ ]h i')) (17)
Stable(') := [8](' $ :h i') (18)
These deﬁnitions restate the meta-language deﬁnitions summarized in Tables 1
and 2. Let us explain them in details again. A set of arguments ' is acceptable
with respect to the set of arguments   if and only all '-arguments are such
that for all their attackers there exists a defender in   (Formula 14). A set of
arguments ' is conﬂict free if and only if all '-arguments are such that none of
their attackers is in ' (Formula 15). A set of arguments ' is admissible if and
only if it is conﬂict free and acceptable with respect to itself (Formula 16). A set
' is a complete extension if and only if it is conﬂict free and it is equivalent to
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thesetofargumentsalltheattackersofwhichareattackedbysome'-argument
(Formula17). Finally, aset'isastableextensionifandonlyifitisequivalentto
the set of arguments whose attackers are not in ' (Formula 18). The adequacy
of these deﬁnitions with respect to the standard ones (see Table A in Appendix
A) is easily checked.
Example 2. (Argumentation labelings in K8) According to [5], a labeling function
is a complete labeling if and only if the following holds for each argument: a) an
argument is labeled 1, i.e., in, i all its attackers are labeled 0, i.e., out. b) an argument
is labeled 0, i.e., out, i there exists at least one attacker labeled 1. The reformulation of
a)-b) in K8 goes as follows:
[8]((1 $ [ ]0) ^ (0 $ h i1) ^ Label) (19)
where Label is the propositional formula described in Example 1. So, a valuation I on
analphabetcontaining1,0and?isacompletelabelingforanargumentationframework
A i the model (A;I) satisﬁes Formula 19. Also, it is a matter of propositional
reasoning to see that Formula 19 is equivalent to the following formula:
Compl(1) ^ [8]((0 $ h i1) ^ Label) (20)
In words, this means that a function I on an alphabet containing 1, 0 and ? is a
completelabelingofAifandonlyifthemodel(A;I)makes1tobeacompleteextension
(Formula 17) and evaluates the labels 0 and ? accordingly. We obtain therefore a direct
correspondence between complete labelings and complete extensions. The same could
be done for stable extensions.
Logic K8 has therefore sucient expressive power to capture a number of
central results of argumentation theory. In this section we provide a sample of
such results taken from [11], formalized and proved within K8.
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Lemma). The following formula is a theorem of K8:
Adm(') ^ Acc(  _ ;') ! Adm(' _  ) ^ Acc(;' _  ) (21)
Sketch. A full formal derivation is given in Appendix C. 
Notice that Theorem 2 is, in fact, a generalized version of the Fundamental
Lemma proven in [11]. It states that if ' is admissible and both   and  are
acceptable with respect to it then also   _  is admissible and  is acceptable
with respect to ' _  .
Weprovideonemoreexampleoftheoremsofabstractargumentationwhich
can be obtained as formal theorems of K8.
Theorem 3 (Stable implies admissible and complete). The following formulae are
theorems of K8:
Stable(') ! Adm(') (22)
Stable(') ! Complete(') (23)
Proof. Formula 22 follows from Fact 2 and the completeness of K8. Formula 23
is a direct corollary of Formula 22, the deﬁnition of Stable('), the deﬁnition of
Complete(') and the completeness of K8. 
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Formulae 22 and 23 state well-known facts about the relative strength of
admissible, complete and stable extensions. Other results can be formalized
alongthesamelines. Whatthissectionaimedatshowingisthat, alreadywithin
a rather standard modal systems such as K8, quite many notions and results of
abstract argumentation can be accommodated. The next section shows what
kind of modal machinery is needed to capture the notion of grounded extension
which we have not yet discussed.
5 Argumentation in K: least ﬁxpoints
The present section shows what kind of modal machinery is needed to capture
the notion of grounded extension left aside in Section 2. In [11], the grounded
extension is deﬁned as the smallest ﬁxpoint of the characteristic function of an
argumentation framework (see Table A).
5.1 Characteristic functions and ﬁxpoints
LetusgobackforamomenttologicK 1,andtothewayits[ ]h i-formulaefor-
malizing the notion of characteristic function of a given argumentation model
(Section3.3). Carryingonwiththeanalogy,wehavethataformula'isa[ ]h i-
ﬁxpoint for an argumentation model M if and only if M j= ' $ [ ]h i'. We
have the following.
Corollary 1 (Existence of [ ]h i-ﬁxpoints). For every argumentation model M,
there exist a greatest and a least [ ]h i-ﬁxpoint.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 1 and Fact 3 via a direct application of
theKnaster-Tarskiﬁxpointtheorem4 onterL[ ]h i = (L[ ]h i;^;:;?;[ ]h i). 
Logic K 1 does not have the necessary expressive power to talk about great-
est and least ﬁxpoints for [ ]h i. In the next section, we take the   fragment of
K 1 and enhance it with ﬁxpoint operators, thus moving into the realm of the
so-called -calculi [4].
5.2 A -calculus for argumentation
The present section introduces the -calculus in the context of argumentation
theory.
5.2.1 Language.
As already noticed at the beginning of Section 4, we can proﬁtably restrict
LK 1
to its “being attacked” part K, that is, only to operators h i and [ ]. We
introduce the least ﬁxpoint operator  on the top of this language, obtaining
the language LK
deﬁned via the following BNF:
LK
: ' ::= p j ? j :' j ' ^ ' j h i' j p:'(p)
4We refer the interested reader to [9] for a neat formulation of this result.
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where p ranges over P and '(p) indicates that p occurs free in ' (i.e., it is not
bounded by ﬁxpoint operators) and under an even number of negations.5 In
general, the notation '( ) stands for   occurs in '. The usual deﬁnitions for
Boolean and modal operators can be applied. Intuitively, p:'(p) denotes the
smallest formula p such that p $ '(p). This intuition is made precise in the
semantics of LK
given in Deﬁnition 4. The greatest ﬁxpoint operator  can be
deﬁned from  as follows: x:'(x) := :x::'(:x).
5.2.2 Semantics.
The semantics of -calculi is most perspicuously given in an algebraic fashion,
which is what we do in the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Satisfaction for LK
in argumentation models). Let ' 2 LK
. The
satisfaction of ' by a pointed argumentation model (M;a) is inductively deﬁned as
follows:
M;a 6j= ?
M;a j= p i a 2 I(p); for p 2 P
M;a j= :' i a < jj'jjM
M;a j= '1 ^ '2 i a 2 jj'1jjM \ jj'2jjM
M;a j= h i' i a 2 fb j 9c : b   c & c 2 jj'jjMg
M;a j= p:'(p) i a 2
\
fX 2 2A j jj'jjM[p:=X]  Xg
where jj'jjM[p:=X] denotes the truth-set of ' once I(p) is set to be X. As usual, we say
that: ' is valid in an argumentation model M i it is satisﬁed in all pointed models of
M, i.e., M j= '; ' is valid in a class M of argumentation models i it is valid in all its
models, i.e., M j= '. All deﬁnitions are naturally generalizable to sets of formulae .
We have now all the logical machinery in place to express the notion of
grounded extension. Set '(p) := [ ]h ip, that is, take '(p) to be the modal
version [ ]h i of the characteristic function, and apply it to formula p. What
we obtain is a modal formula expressing the least ﬁxpoint of a characteristic
function, that is, the grounded extension:
Grounded := p:[ ]h ip (24)
Notice that, unlike the notions formalized in Formulae 14-18, the grounded ex-
tension of a framework is always unique and does not depend on the particular
labeling of a given model.
5.2.3 Axiomatics.
The standard axiomatics for the -calculus built on modal system K suces
for our purposes. Logic K is axiomatized by the following rules and axiom
5Thissyntacticrestrictionguaranteesthateveryformula'(p)deﬁnesasettransformationwhich
preserves , which in turn guarantees the existence of least and greatest ﬁxpoints by the Knaster-
Tarski ﬁxpoint theorem.
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schemata.
(Prop) propositional schemata
(K) [ ]('1 ! '2) ! ([ ]'1 ! [ ]'2)
(Fixpoint) '(p:'(p)) $ p:'(p)
(MP) if ` '1 ! '2 and ` '1 then '2
(N) if ` ' then ` [ ]'
(Least) if ` '1('2) ! '2 then ` p:'1(p) ! '2
So, the axiomatics of K consists of the axiom system K axiomatizing h i plus
schema Fixpoint and rule Least. Let us have a closer look at what they
state. Axiom Fixpoint just states that p:'(p) is indeed a ﬁxpoint since a
further application of ' still yields p:'(p) and vice versa. Instead, rule Least
guarantees that p:'(p) is in fact the least ﬁxpoint by imposing that if '2 is
provably a pre-ﬁxpoint of '1, then p:'1(p) provably implies '2.
5.2.4 Meta-theoretical results.
We list some relevant known results.
 Logic K is sound and complete for the class A of all argumentation
models under the semantics given in Deﬁnition 4 [27]. Notice however
that,unlikeK 1 andK8,thegivenaxiomaticsofK isnotstronglycomplete
since it is obviously not compact.
 The satisﬁability problem of K is decidable [23].
 The complexity of the model-checking problem for K is known to be in
NP \ co-NP [16]. However, it is known that the model-checking problem
for a formula of size m and alternation depth d on a system of size n is
O(m  nd+1) [13], where the alternation depth of a formula of LK
is the
maximum number of =:: alternations in a chain of nested ﬁxpoints.
5.3 Doing argumentation in K
Like in Section 4.2 we give a couple of examples of the kind of argumentation-
theoretic results formalizable in K.
Theorem 4 (Grounded extension is conﬂict-free). The following formula is a va-
lidity of K:
Grounded ! :[ ]Grounded (25)
Proof. ConsiderFormula24andproceedperabsurdum. Takeanargumentation
model M such that M j= p:[ ]h ip ^ :[ ]:(p:[ ]h ip). By the Deﬁnition 4
we obtain that M j= p:[ ]h ip and that there exist a arguments a;b such that
a   b and M;b j= p:[ ]h ip while also M;a j= p:[ ]h ip. We distinguish
two cases: 1) there exists a ﬁnite chain (a   b   b1   :::   bn) of successors
starting from a; 2) there exists an inﬁnite such chain. If 1) is the case, then
M;bn j= [ ]' for any '. Since both M;a j= p:[ ]h ip and M;b j= p:[ ]h ip,
then M;bn 1 j= p:[ ]h ip which, by Deﬁnition 4, means that for any p such
that jj[ ]h ipjjM  jjpjjM, M;bn 1 j= [ ]h ip, which is impossible given that for
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any ' M;bn j= [ ]' and hence that M;bn 1 j= h i[ ]:p. If 2) is the case, then
we show that jjp:[ ]h ipjjM = ;. This is the case since the two following sets
are both pre-ﬁxpoints but they have empty intersection: fc 2 A ja  2m cg and
fc 2 A jb  2m cg where  2m denotes reachability via   in an even number of
steps. We thus obtain a contradiction. 
Like Theorem 1, Theorem 4 provides a modal logic formulation of an
argumentation-theoretic result.
As to the complexity of model-checking grounded extensions, it turns out
to be tractable.
Theorem 5 (Model-checking grounded extensions). Given an argumentation
model M, it can be decided in polynomial time whether an argument a belongs to
the grounded extension of M, that is, whether M;a j= p:[ ]h ip.
Proof. Sincep:[ ]h iphasalternationdepth0,bytheresultreportedinSection
5.2.4, it follows that model-checking p:[ ]h ip can be done in O(m  n) where
m is the size of p:[ ]h ip and n the size of M. 
6 Dialogue games via semantic games
The proof-theory of abstract argumentation is commonly given in terms of
dialoguegames[21]. Thepresentsectionshowshowmodalsemanticssupports
a general setting for the development of proof procedures based on games [18].
In particular we will focus on the so-called evaluation games or model-checking
games where a proponent or veriﬁer (9ve) tries to prove that a given formula '
holds in a point a of a model M, while an opponent or falsiﬁer (8dam) tries to
disprove it.
The present section will describe the evaluation game for K8 which is a
straightforward extension of the evaluation game for K but which, to the best
ofourknowledge,hasnotyetbeeninvestigated. Foranexpositionofevaluation
games for K we refer the reader to [26].
6.1 Evaluation game for K8
We now introduce the game-theoretical semantics [18] of logic K8 placing it in
the context of abstract argumentation. The notation is borrowed from [26].
Such a game is a graph game, that is, a game played by two agents on a
directed graph, where each node—called position—is labelled by the player
that is supposed to move next. The structure of the graph determines which
are the admissible moves at any given position. If a player has to move in a
certain position but there are no available moves, then it loses and its opponent
wins. In general, graph games might have inﬁnite paths, but this is not the case
in the game we are going to introduce. A match of a graph game is then just the
set of positions visited during play, that is, a complete path through the graph.
Here is the formal deﬁnition of the evaluation game for K8.
Deﬁnition 5 (Evaluation game for K8). Given a formula ' 2 LK8
, and an ar-
gumentation model M, the evaluation game E(';M) is deﬁned by the following
items.
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Position Turn Available moves
('1 _ '2;a) 9 f('1;a);('2;a)g
('1 ^ '2;a) 8 f('1;a);('2;a)g
(h i';a) 9 f(';b) j (a;b) 2 1g
([ ]';a) 8 f(';b) j (a;b) 2 1g
(h8i';a) 9 f(';b) j b 2 Ag
([8]';a) 8 f(';b) j b 2 Ag
(?;a) 9 ;
(>;a) 8 ;
(p;a) & a < I(p) 9 ;
(p;a) & a 2 I(p) 8 ;
(:p;a) & a 2 I(p) 9 ;
(:p;a) & a < I(p) 8 ;
Table 3: Rules of the evaluation game for K8.
Players: The set of players is f9;8g. An element from f9;8g will be denoted P and its
opponent P.
Game form: The game form of E(';M) is deﬁned by the rules given in Table 3.
Winning conditions: Player P wins if and only if P has to play in a position with no
available moves.
Instantiation: The instance of game E(';M) with starting point (';a) is denoted
E(';M)@(';a).
The important thing to notice is that positions of the game are pairs of a for-
mula and an argument, and that the type of formula in the position determines
which player has to play: 9 if the formula is a disjunction, a box, a false atom
or ?, and 8 in the remaining cases.6
We can now deﬁne the notions of winning strategies and positions.
Deﬁnition 6 (Winning strategies and positions). A strategy for player P in an
instantiated game E(';M)@(';a) is a function telling P what to do in any match
6Notice also that the game considers only positions consisting of formulae in positive normal
form, that is, formulae where all negations are pushed inwards and occur only in front of atomic
formulae.
18Davide Grossi Doing Argumentation Theory in ML
played from position (';a). Such a strategy is winning for P if and only if, in
any match played according to the strategy, P wins. A position (';a) in E(';M) is
winning for P if and only if P has a winning strategy in E(';M)@(';a). The set of
winning positions of E(';M) is denoted WinP(E(';M)).
Fromthepointofviewofgametheory[20],thegamedescribedinDeﬁnition
5 and with the winning conditions introduced in Deﬁnition 6 is a two-players
zero-sum game. Such games have the property that P wins if and only if
P looses (zero-sum), and that they are determined, that is, each match has a
winner [28].
It now remains to be proven that the game just introduced is adequate with
respect to the semantics of K8. To put it otherwise, we have to prove that
if 9 always wins then the formula deﬁning the game is true at the point of
instantiation, and that if a formula is true at a point in a model, then 9 always
wins the corresponding game instantiated at that point.
Theorem 6 (Adequacy of the evaluation game for K8). Let ' 2 LK8
, and let
M = (A;I) be an argumentation model. Then, for any argument a 2 A, it holds that:
(';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)) () M;a j= ':
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length l of '.
Base. l = 0. We have four cases:
 ' = >. Straightforward since (';a) is then always a winning position for
9.
 ' = ?. Straightforward since (';a) is then never a winning position for
9.
 ' = p. It follows that if a 2 I(p) then (';a) is a winning position for 9 and
if a < I(p) then (';a) is not a winning position for 9.
 ' = :p. The converse argument applies.
Step. l > 0. The induction hypothesis is that for any subformula   of ' of
length l   1, and for any b 2 A, ( ;b) 2 Win9(E( ;M)) () M;b j=  . We have
the following cases:
 ' =  1 ^  2. From left to right. Assume (';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)). Now, '
is a conjunction, hence it is 8’s turn to move. It follows that ( 1;a) and
( 2;a) are both winning positions for 9 in the corresponding games. By
induction hypothesis, we thus have M;a j=  1 and M;a j=  2. From right
to left. Assume M;a j= '. It follows that M;a j=  1 and M;a j=  2. By
induction hypothesis we obtain that both ( 1;a) and ( 2;a) are winning
positions for 9, and thus so is (';a).
 ' =  1 _  2. From left to right. Assume (';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)). It
is 9’s turn to move, so one of ( 1;a) and ( 2;a) should be a winning
position in the corresponding game. Assume WLOG it to be ( 1;a). By
induction hypothesis it follows that M;a j=  1 and therefore M;a j= '.
From right to left. Assume M;a j= ' and assume WLOG that M;a j=  1.
By induction hypothesis we obtain that ( 1;a) 2 Win9(E( 1;M)). Since '
is a disjunction, it is 9’s turn to move and therefore we conclude (';a) 2
Win9(E(';M)).
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b
Labeled 
Nixon Diamond
p
(p   [ ](p   ¬   p),a)
([ ](p   ¬   p),a)
(p   ¬   p,a) (p   ¬   p,b)
(¬p   ¬   p,a) (p      p,a)
(¬   p,a) (¬p,a)
(p,a)
(p,b)
Figure 1: Game for stable extensions in the 2-cycle with labeling (valuation)
function.
 ' = h i . Fromlefttoright. Assume(';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)). Itis9’sturn
to move. It follows that there is a position ( ;b) such that a   b and such
thatisawinningpositionfor9. Byinductionhypothesisweconcludethat
M;b j=   and hence M;a j= h i . From right to left. Assume M;a j= '.
It follows that there exists b such that a   b and M;b j=  . By induction
hypothesiswehavethat( ;b) 2 Win9(E( ;M)). Butitis9’sturntomove,
hence we conclude (';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)).
 ' = [ ] . From left to right. Assume (';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)). It is 8’s turn
tomove. Itfollowsthatforallb 2 Asuchthata   b( ;b) 2 Win9(E( ;M)).
From this, by induction hypothesis, we conclude that for all b 2 A such
that a   b, M;b j=  . From right to left. Assume M;a j= '. It follows
that for all b 2 A such that a   b, M;b j=  . By induction hypothesis we
thus obtain that for all b 2 A, ( ;b) 2 Win9(E( ;M)). This proves that
(';a) 2 Win9(E(';M)).
 ' = h8i . Similar to the case for ' = h i .
 ' = [8] . Similar to the case for ' = [ ] .
This completes the proof. 
In the next section we illustrate how this type of semantic games can be
used as a general setting for games checking whether an argument of a given
framework belongs to a speciﬁc extension under a given labeling.
6.2 Games for model-checking extensions
The following example shows how the game-theoretical semantics of modal
logic can be used to provide games for abstract argumentation. We choose to
discuss in details the game for stable semantics, which has remained an open
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Adm : E(' ^ Adm(');M)@(' ^ Adm(');a)
Complete : E(' ^ Complete(');M)@(' ^ Complete(');a)
Stable : E(' ^ Stable('));M)@(' ^ Stable(');a)
Grounded : E(Grounded;M)@(Grounded;a)
Table 4: Games for admissible, complete, stable and grounded sets.
question among argumentation theorists for a while [8]. Such a game neatly
follows as the evaluation game for formula Stable (Formula 18) of K8 .
Example 3 (Model-checking the Nixon diamond). Let A = (fa;bg;f(a;b);(b;a)g)
be an argumentation framework consisting of two arguments a and b attacking each
other (i.e., the Nixon diamond), and consider the labeling I assigning 1 to a and 0 to
b (top right corner of Figure 1). We now want to run an evaluation game for checking
whether a belongs to a stable extension corresponding to the truth-set of 1. Such game
is the game E(1 ^ Stable(1);(A;I)) initialized at position (1 ^ Stable(1);a). That is,
spelling out the deﬁnition of Stable(1): E(1 ^ [8](1 $ :h i1))@(1 ^ [8](1 $ :h 
i1);a). Such a game, played according to the rules in Deﬁnitions 5 and 6, gives rise to
the tree partially depicted in Figure 1.
IntheprevioussectionandintheexamplewehavefocusedonlyonlogicK8.
However, logic K can also be given an analogous game-theoretical semantics,
whichdeliversthetypeoflogicgamesnecessarytocheckwhetheranargument
a in a given model M belongs to the grounded extension p:[ ]h ip. We do
not work out the details here and we refer the reader to [26].
In general, evaluation games permit us to give a systematic presentation of
games for checking membership of an argument to admissible sets, as well as
complete, stable and grounded extensions by instantiating a game E(';M) at
the given argument where ' expresses the to-be-checked set or extension. Such
systematization is provided in Table 4. Notice that what changes is only the
modal formula inputted in the game.
Now the natural question arises of what is the precise relationship between
the games just exposed and the dialogue games normally studied in the lit-
erature on argumentation theory (see, for instance, [21]). The next section is
concerned with this question.
6.3 Model-checking games vs. dialogue games
Thebestwaytohighlightthedierencebetweenmodel-checkinggamesanddi-
alogue games is by pointing considerations of a complexity-theoretic kind. We
have seen, in Sections 4.2 and 5.3, that checking whether an argument belongs
to a speciﬁc admissible set, or an extension (complete, stable or grounded) can
be done in polynomial time. However, it is well-known that checking whether
anargumentbelongstoanextensioncanbeharder(e.g. NP-completeforstable
extensions [12]). So where is the trick?
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In model-checking games you are given a model M = (A;I), a formula '
andanargumenta, and9veisaskedtoprovethatM;a j= '. Indialoguegames,
the check appointed to 9ve is inherently more complex since the input consists
there of only an argumentation framework A, a formula ' and an argument a.
9ve is then asked to prove that there exists a labeling I such that (A;I);a j= '.
This is not a model-checking problem but a satisﬁability problem in a pointed
frame [1] which, in turn, is essentially a model-checking problem in monadic
second-order logic: “A j= 8p1;:::;pn:STa(')?” where p1;:::;pn are the atoms
occurring in ' and STa(') is the standard translation of ' realized in state a.7
To conclude, we might say that the games deﬁned above provide a proof
procedure for a reasoning task which is computationally simpler than the one
tackled by standard dialogue games. It should be noted, however, that this
is no intrinsic limitation to the logic-based approach advocated in the present
paper. Model-checking games for monadic second-order logic (or rather for
appropriate fragments of it) would accommodate dialogue games in their en-
tirety, lifting the sort of systematization they enable—in the form exempliﬁed
by Table 4—to dialogue games.
7 When are two arguments the same?
Since abstract argumentation neglects the internal structure of arguments, the
natural question arises of when two arguments can be said to be equivalent, or
be “the same”, from the point of view of argumentation theory. Such a notion
of equivalence will necessarily be of a structural nature and, to be of any inter-
est, be weaker than plain isomorphism. The study of a notion of equivalence
for argumentation has not received attention yet by the argumentation theory
community, except for one recent notable exception [19], which deﬁnes a no-
tion of strong equivalence for argumentation frameworks, borrowed from the
analogous notion developed in logic programming.
Modal logic oers a readily available notion of structural equivalence, the
notion of bisimulation (with all its variants) [1, 15]. This section sketches the
use of bisimulation for argumentation theoretic purposes. To illustrate the
issue we use a simple motivating example depicted in Figure 2. We have two
labelled argumentation frameworks which both contain an argument labeled p
which is attacked by some arguments labelled q. Now the question would be:
are the two p-arguments equivalent as far as abstract argumentation theory is
concerned? The answer is yes, and the next sections explain why.
7.1 Indistinguishability of arguments in K8
It is well-known that logic K is invariant under bisimulation. It is, in fact,
the bisimulation-invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic [26]. In the
present section we will focus on the speciﬁc notion of bisimulation which is
tailored to K8, also called total bisimulation.
We brieﬂy recapitulate the notion of bisimulation [1, 15] presenting it in an
argumentation-theoretic ﬂavor.
7For the standard translation we refer the reader to [1].
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a x
y c
b
M M 
p
q
p
q q
Figure 2: Two (totally) bisimilar arguments (c and y) in two argumentation
models.
Deﬁnition 7 (Total bisimulation). Let M = (A;;I) and M0 = (A0;0;I0) be two
argumentation models. A bisimulation between M and M0 is a non-empty relation
Z  A  A0 such that for any aZa0:
Atom: a and a0 are propositionally equivalent;
Zig: if a   b for some b 2 A, then a0   b0 for some b0 2 A0 and bZb0;
Zag: if a0   b0 for some b0 2 A then a   b for some i
¯
nA and aZa0.
A total bisimulation is a bisimulation Z  A  A0 such that its left projection covers
A and its right projection covers A0. When a total bisimulation exists between M and
M0 we write (M;a) - (M0;a0).
Now, since logic K8 is invariant under total bisimulation [1] and logic K
underbisimulation[15],weobtainanaturalnotionof“sameness”ofarguments,
whichisweakerthanthenotionofisomorphismofargumentationframeworks.
If two arguments are “the same” in this perspective, then they are equivalent
fromthepointofviewofargumentationtheory, asfarasthenotionsexpressible
in those logics are concerned. In particular, we obtain the following simple
theorem for free.
Theorem 7 (Bisimilar arguments). Let (M;a) and (M0;a0) be two pointed models,
and let Z be a total bisimulation between M and M0. It holds that:
M;a j= CFree(') ^ ' () M0;a0 j= CFree(') ^ '
M;a j= Adm(') ^ ' () M0;a0 j= Adm(') ^ '
M;a j= Complete(') ^ ' () M0;a0 j= Complete(') ^ '
M;a j= Stable(') ^ ' () M0;a0 j= Stable(') ^ '
M;a j= Grounded () M0;a0 j= Grounded:
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that bisimulation implies K-equivalence
[15], and total bisimulation implies K8-equivalence [1]. 
In other words, Theorem 7 states that if two arguments are totally bisimilar,
thentheyareindistinguishablefromthepointofviewofabstractargumentation
in the sense that the ﬁrst belongs to a given conﬂict-free, or admissible set ' if
andonlyifalsotheseconddoes,andtheﬁrstbelongstoagivenstable,complete
extension ', or to the grounded extension, if and only if also the second does.
23Davide Grossi Doing Argumentation Theory in ML
Position Available moves
((M;a)(M0;a0)) f((M;a)(M0;b0)) j 9b0 2 A0 : a0   b0g
[f((M;b)(M0;a0)) j 9b 2 A : a   bg
[f((M;a)(M0;b0)) j 9b0 2 A0g
[f((M;b)(M0;a0)) j 9b 2 Ag
Table 5: Rules of the bisimulation game for K8
7.2 Total bisimulation games
We can associate a game to Deﬁnition 7. Such game checks whether two given
pointed models (M;a) and (M;a0) are bisimilar or not. The game is played by
two players: Spoiler, which tries to show that the two given pointed models
are not bisimilar, and Duplicator which pursues the opposite goal. A match
is started by S, then D responds, and so on. If and only if D moves to a
position where the two pointed models are not propositionally equivalent, or if
it cannot move, S wins. The following deﬁnition describes formally the game
just sketched.
Deﬁnition 8 (Bisimulation game for K8). Given two pointed models M and M0,
the total bisimulation game B(M;M0) is deﬁned by the following items.
Players: The set of players is fD;Sg. An element from fD;Sg will be denoted P and
its opponent P.
Game form: The game form of B(M;M0) is deﬁned by the rules given in Table 5.
Turn function: If the round is even S plays, if it is odd D plays.
Winning conditions: S wins if and only if either D has moved to some position
((M;a)(M0;a0)) where a and a0 do not satisfy the same labels, or D has no
available moves. Otherwise D wins.
Instantiation: The instance of B(M;M0) with starting position ((M;a)(M0;a0)) is
denoted B(M;M0)@(a;a0).
So, as we might expect, positions in a (total) bisimulation games are pairs of
pointed models, that is, the pointed models that D tries to show are bisimilar. It
might also be instructive to notice that such a game can have inﬁnite matches,
which, according to Deﬁnition 8 are thus won by D.
FromDeﬁnition8weobtainthefollowingnotionsofwinningstrategiesand
winning positions.
Deﬁnition 9 (Winning strategies and positions). A strategy for player P in an
instantiated game B(M;M0)@(a;a0) is a function telling P what to do in any match
played from position (a;a0). Such a strategy is winning for P if and only if, in
any match played according to the strategy, P wins. A position ((M;a)(M0;a0)) in
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(M,c)(M ,y)
(M,c)(M ,y) (M,c)(M ,x)
(M,c)(M ,y)
(M,b)(M ,y) (M,b)(M ,y)
(M,b)(M ,x)
(M,b)(M ,y)
(M,a)(M ,x)
D wins! D wins!
S wins!
(M,a)(M ,x)
(M,b)(M ,x)
(M,b)(M ,x) (M,b)(M ,y)
S
D
S
D
S
Figure 3: Part of the total bisimulation game played on the models in Figure 2.
B(M;M0)iswinningforPifandonlyifPhasawinningstrategyinB(M;M0)@(a;a0).
ThesetofallwinningpositionsofgameB(M;M0)forPisdenotedbyWinP(B(M;M0)).
Alsointhecaseof(total)bisimulationgameswehaveanadequacytheorem.
Theorem 8 (Adequacy of total bisimulation games). Take (M;a) and (M0;a0) to
be two argumentation models. It holds that:
((M;a)(M0;a0)) 2 WinD(B(M;M0)) () (M;a) - (M0;a0):
Proof. The proof is standard and we refer the reader to [15]. 
In other words, D has a winning strategy in the total bisimulation game
B(M;M0)@(a;a0) if and only if M;a and M0;a0 are totally bisimilar. The follow-
ing example illustrates how a total bisimulation game concretely looks like.
Example 4 (A total bisimulation game). Let us play a total bisimulation game on
the two models M and M0 given in Figure 2. A total bisimulation connects c with
y, and a and b with x. Part of the extensive bisimulation game B(M;M0)@(c; y) is
depicted in Figure 3. Notice that D wins on those inﬁnite paths where it can always
duplicate S’s moves. On the other hand, it looses for instance when it replies to one
of S’s moves ((M;b)(M0;x)) by moving in the second model to argument y, which is
labelled p while b is not.
8 Discussion
In this section we address some related work and an important missing piece
of our analysis.
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8.1 Preferred extensions in modal logic?
Thepaperhasnotdealtwithoneimportantnotionofargumentation: preferred
extensions. In[11],preferredextensionsaredeﬁnedasmaximal,withrespectto
set-inclusion, complete extensions. The natural question is whether the logics
we have introduced are expressive enough to capture this notion too.
Technically, this means looking for a formula '(p) such that for any pointed
modelM = ((A;I);a)M;a j= '(p)ia 2 jjpjjM andjjpjjM isapreferredextension
of A, where p 2 P. It is easy to see that such '(p) can be expressed in monadic
second-order logic with a 1
1 quantiﬁcation:
p ^ STx(Compl(p)) ^ 8q(STx(Compl(q)) ! :(p @ q)) (26)
where STx(Compl(p)) denotes the standard translation [1] of the K8 formula for
complete extensions (Formula 17) and q v p means just that jjqjjM  jjpjjM, i.e.,
the truth set of q is included in the truth-set of p. Now the good news is that
Formula 26 turns out to be invariant under total bisimulation (Deﬁnition 7).
Theorem9(Preferredandtotalbisimulation). Take'(p)tobedeﬁnedasinFormula
26 and let - denote a total bisimulation relation. For any two pointed models (M;a)
and (M0;a0) it holds that:
(M;a) - (M0;a0) =) (M;a) j= '(p) () M0;a0 j= '(p)
(Sketch). Assume per absurdum that M0;a0 j= 9q(STx(Compl(q)) ^ (p @ q)). By
Deﬁnition 7 and Theorem 7 we obtain M;a j= q^STx(Compl(q))^(p @ q) which
contradicts the assumption. The other direction is similar. 
Inshort,Theorem9statesthatthemonadicsecond-orderformulaexpressing
preferred extensions is invariant under total bisimulation. So, although not
expressible in K, which is precisely equivalent to the bisimulation invariant
fragmentofmonadicsecond-order[26], Formula26shouldbeexpressibleinK
extended with the universal modality. Such formulation, which should rely on
a smart use of the  operator, still deﬁes us and is left for future work. Notice
also that as a consequence of Theorem 9, Theorem 7 carries over to preferred
extensions.
8.2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have dealt with the relationship
between logic and argumentation theory. The ﬁrst one is [3] which presents
preliminaryworkaimedatgeneralizingabstractargumentationwithinalogical
language. There are two main dierences with our approach: ﬁrst, proposi-
tionalatomsdenoteargumentsinsteadofsetsofarguments;second,thevarious
extensions, instead of being deﬁned in the logic, are taken to be primitives. The
resulting logic is non-standard and no proof procedures (e.g., calculi or games)
nor meta-theoretical results are studied.
The second one [7] is closer in purpose to our work. It aims at deﬁning sev-
eral notions of extensions within modal logic. However, while our approach is
eminently model-theoretical, [7] proceeds from a proof-theoretic point of view,
characterizingcompleteandgroundedextensionswithinprovabilitylogic. Un-
like in our approach, also [7] uses propositional atoms to denote arguments
rather than sets thereof.
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9 Conclusions and future work
The following is a non-exhaustive list of the future research lines we envision
at the interface of modal logic and argumentation theory:
 FindaK formula(possiblyextendedwithuniversalmodality)expressing
preferred extensions.
 Apply the same methods to obtain modal-logic formulations of other
argumentation-theoretic notions, such as semi-stable sets[6].
 Investigate MSO model-checking games as a more general logical setting
for dialogue games than the modal model-checking games presented in
the paper.
 Developasystematiccomparisonofmodel-checkinggamesandstandard
dialogue games for argumentation.
 Develop the application of the notion of bisimulation to the study of
invariance in the context of argumentation theory, for instance by charac-
terizing the notion of accrual within graded modal logic [10].
 Apply sabotage modal logic [24] to study the robustness of the member-
ship of an argument to a certain set or extension denoted by a formula
'.
 Apply the methods and techniques developed in dynamic logic [25] for
the “dynamiﬁcation” of modal logic to study the dynamics of argumen-
tation.
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A Basics of argumentation theory
Let A = (A;) be an argumentation framework where A is a set of arguments
and  A  A. Table A brieﬂy recapitulates the key notions developed in [11]
which are considered in the paper. For an explanation of the order-theoretic
notions involved in the deﬁnitions we refer the reader to [9].
The notions in Table A obtain the following intuitive reading. The charac-
teristic function assigns to each set of arguments X the set of arguments cA(X)
which X defends—by attacking all the attackers of cA(X). A set X is said to
be acceptable with respect to a set Y if and only if all its arguments are de-
fended by arguments in Y. The notion of conﬂict-freeness is self-explanatory.
An admissible set is a set of arguments X which is condlict-free and is able to
defend all its attackers. So, admissible sets can be thought of as ‘admissible’
positionswithinanargumentation. Byconsideringthoseadmissiblesetswhich
contain all their defenders, we obtain the notion of complete extension, which
somehow formalizes the idea of a fully exploited admissible position, that is,
a position which has no conﬂicts, and which consists exactly of all that it can
successfully defend.
Stable, grounded and preferred extensions can all be considered to be re-
ﬁnements of this latter notion. A grounded extension, instead, represents what
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cA characteristic function of A i cA : 2A  ! 2A s.t.
cA(X) = fa j 8b : [b  a ) 9c 2 X : c  b]g
X is acceptable w.r.t. Y in A i X  cA(Y)
X conﬂict-free in A i @a;b 2 X s.t. a  b
X admissible set of A i X is conﬂict-free and X  cA(X)
i X is a conﬂict-free post-ﬁxpoint of cA
X complete extension of A i X is conﬂict-free and X = cA(X)
i X is a conﬂict-free ﬁxpoint of cA
X stable extension of A i X is a complete extension of A
and 8b < X;9a 2 X : a  b
i X = fa 2 A j @b 2 X : b  ag
X grounded extension of A i X is the minimal complete extension of A
i X is the least ﬁxpoint of cA
X preferred extension of A i X is a maximal complete extension of A
Table 6: Basic notions of argumentation theory.
all complete extensions have in common. In a way, it formalizes the notion of
what should be at least taken as ‘reasonable’ within the current argumentation.
On the contrary, preferred extensions are maximal complete extensions which
remain conﬂict-free and, as such, they represent somehow the most it can be
‘reasonably’ claimed within the given argumentation framework. Finally, a
stable extension is a set of arguments X which is a complete extension and
which attacks all arguments which do not belong to X itself. As such, it can be
viewed as an ‘aggressive’ position within an argumentation.
B Completeness of logic K 1
Theorem 10 (Soundness and strong completeness of K 1). Logic K 1 is sound
and strongly complete for the class A of all argumentation models under the semantics
given in Deﬁnition 2.
Sketch of proof. Logic K 1 extends logic K with the Conv axiom. Logic K is
deﬁned on the sublanguage of LK 1
containing only one modality (either hi
or h i), and is sound and strongly complete with respect to A [1]. To obtain the
desired results it suces to show that the canonical model of K 1 is such that
hi is interpreted on the converse of the relation on which h i is interpreted,
30Davide Grossi Doing Argumentation Theory in ML
and vice versa. Let MK 1
= (AK 1
;RK 1
;IK 1
) be the canonical model of K 1. We
want to prove that, for all a;a0 2 AK 1
: aRK 1
a0 if and only if a0RK 1 1a. [Left
to right] Assume aRK 1
a0 and suppose ' 2 a. For axiom Conv, it follows that
[]h i' 2 a and therefore, since aRK 1
a0, h i' 2 a0. Hence, by the deﬁnition
of the canonical accessibility relation, a0RK 1 1a. [Right to left] An analogous
argument applies. 
C A formal proof of the Fundamental Lemma
1: ' ! ' _   Prop
2: h i' ! h i(' _  ) 1;K   derived rule
3: [ ]h i' ! [ ]h i(' _  ) 2;K   derived rule
4: ( _  ! ) ! ( ! ) Prop
5: (  _  ! [ ]h i') ! ( ! [ ]h i') 4;instance
6: (  _  ! [ ]h i') ! ( ! [ ]h i' _  ) 5;3;Prop;MP
7: [8](  _  ! [ ]h i') ! [8]( ! [ ]h i' _  ) 6;K   derived rule
8: Acc(  _ ;') ! Acc(;' _  ) 7;deﬁnition
9: (  _  ! [ ]h i') ! (  ! [ ]h i') 4;instance
10: [8](  _  ! [ ]h i') ! [8](  ! [ ]h i') 9;K   derived rule
11: Acc(  _ ;') ! Acc( ;') 10;deﬁnition
12: (( ! ) ^ ( ! )) ! ( _  ! ) Prop
13: ([8]( ! ) ^ [8]( ! )) ! [8]( _  ! ) 12;N;K;MP
14: ([8](' ! [ ]h i') ^ [8](  ! [ ]h i')) ! [8](' _   ! [ ]h i') 13;Instance
15: [ ]h i' ! [ ]h i(' _  ) 14;Prop;K;N
16: ([8](' ! [ ]h i') ^ [8](  ! [ ]h i')) ! [8](' _   ! [ ]h i' _  ) 15;Prop;K;N
17: Acc(';') ^ Acc( ;') ! Acc(' _  ;' _  ) 16;deﬁnition
18: Acc(';') ^ Acc(  _ ;') ! Acc(' _  ;' _  ) 17;9;Prop;MP
19: [8](h i' ! :') ! [ ](h i' ! :') Incl
20: [8](h i' ! :') ! ([ ]h i' ! [ ]:') 19;Prop;MP
21: [8][8](h i' ! :') ! [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:') 20;K   derived rule
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22: [8](h i' ! :') ! [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:') 21;S5   derived rule
23: [8](h i' ! :') ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i')
! [8](' _   ! [ ]h i') ^ [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:') 22;Prop;MP
24: [8](h i' ! :') ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i') ! [8](' _   ! [ ]:') 23;Prop;MP
25: [8](h i' ! :' ^ : ) ! [ ](h i' ! :' ^ : ) Incl
26: [8](h i' ! :' ^ : ) ! ([ ]h i' ! [ ]:' ^ : ) 25;K;Prop;MP
27: [8](h i' ! :' ^ : ) ! [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:' ^ : ) 26;S5   derived rule
28: [8](h i' ! :') ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i')
! [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:' ^ : ) 24;27;Prop;MP
29: [8](h i' ! :') ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i')
! [8](' _   ! [ ]h i') ^ [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ]:' ^ : ) 28;Prop;MP
30: [8]( ! ) ^ [8]( ! ) ! [8]( ! ) S5   theorem
31: [8]([ ]h i' ! [ ](:' ^ : )) ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i')
! [8](' _   ! [ ](:' ^ : )) 30;instance
32: [8](h i' ! :') ^ [8](' _   ! [ ]h i')
! [8](' _   ! [ ](:' ^ : )) 29;31;Prop;MP
33: CFree(') ^ Acc(' _  ;') ! CFree(' _  ) 32;deﬁnition
34: Acc(';') ^ Acc( ;') ! Acc(' _  ;') 14;deﬁnition
35: CFree(') ^ Acc(';') ^ Acc( ;') ! CFree(' _  ) 33;34;Prop;MP
36: CFree(') ^ Acc(';') ^ Acc(  _ ;') ! CFree(' _  ) 35;9;Prop;MP
37: CFree(') ^ Acc(';') ^ Acc(  _ ;')
! CFree(' _  ) ^ Acc(' _  ;' _  ) 36;18;Prop;MP
38: CFree(') ^ Acc(';') ^ Acc(  _ ;')
! CFree(' _  ) ^ Acc(' _  ;' _  ) ^ Acc(;' _  ) 37;8;Prop;MP
39: Adm(') ^ Acc(  _ ;') ! Adm(' _  )Acc(;' _  ) 38;deﬁnition
32